Theaetetus Part II

In my last post, I primarily focused on how the beginning of the Theaetetus clandestinely introduces themes that run throughout the rest of the dialogue. In this post, I want to reflect on how the end of the dialogue helps us to interpret all that has come before. Here I am specifically thinking about the revelation that Socrates must end the conversation in order to make it to his trial. Perhaps the most obvious application of this revelation is that the charge that Socrates corrupts the youth is absurd. The Theaetetus shows the extent to which Socrates tries to care for the souls of the youth of Athens, particularly those who look like they will turn out well. Indeed, Socrates and Theodorus are committed to that task. In fact, they are willing to spend long periods of time working with the youth to purge them of false beliefs and direct them towards the truth while also inculcating their students with the virtues (like humility, wisdom, etc.). A second point to note is that the Theaetetus begins with two people talking about the character and excellence of the very person Socrates instructs throughout the dialogue--namely, Theaetetus. It seems that to some extent we are to see that Theaetetus's interaction with Socrates helped him to turn out well. Far from corrupting Theaetetus, Socrates helped him to become a good man who went on to serve Athens well. Indeed, Theaetetus has done so to the point of death. In other dialogues (e.g., the Laches), Plato claims that two necessary conditions for a good teacher is that they themselves are a good person, and that they have demonstrably improved the quality of their pupil. I take it that one of the aims of the Theaetetus is to show that Socrates fits this description, and therefore is a good teacher. A third and final point I will note is that the ending reveals how important caring for the souls of others is to Socrates. He is about to stand trial where it is likely that he will receive the death penalty, and he chooses to spend some of his final hours of freedom caring for the youth by practicing philosophy with them. One of the primary reasons he does this is to improve their souls and his own. This, it seems to me, is quite a daunting standard for us future teachers of philosophy. Faced with our own mortality, we too are choosing to care for the souls of others (especially the youth) by tending to their souls through philosophy. Or at least that is what Plato, I think, would have us see. I must confess that I often fail to see philosophical instruction in that light. Part of the reason for this is that many of my own philosophy instructors have not communicated this message to me. Instead, they have implicitly or explicitly argued that philosophy is about acquiring more knowledge or "pursing the truth." Yet they rarely, if ever, have related these endeavors to the formation and care of the human soul, my soul. I do not want to perpetuate that trend. I want to care for my soul and my students souls. Furthermore, I want to do this in part by practicing philosophy. I think philosophy is deeply medicinal; it helps to cure us of our spiritual ills. Of course, it is also possible to use philosophy in inimical ways that corrupt the soul even more. I fear that many of us will do this if we do not actively and intentionally try to care for our students. In short, I hope we can talk about this question: How can we be caring doctors rather than dispensers of information?

Theaetetus Part I

Spoiler Alert!!! Part of the following blog will reveal some of my presentation for tomorrow's class. Here I go... I continue to find the depth and richness of Plato's dialogues astounding. Consider, for example, the beginning of the Theaetetus. Between 142-146, Plato introduces many of the central themes of the dialogue (the importance of character, seems vs knowledge, age, memory, etc.). Yet he does so in an extremely subtle way. For instance, Euclides announces that he cannot tell Terpsion the exchange between Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus from memory: "Good Lord, no. Not from memory, anyway." (143a) This, it seems to me, serves as moment of foreshadowing that is easy to miss; Theaetetus and Socrates will eventually think long and hard about the relationship between memory and knowledge. A similar example of this is the emphasis with which Theodorus describes the good character of Theatetus. He is a fine young man who is generous with his money (144d) and has an "unusually gentle temper" (144a). This description helps Socrates understand why Theaetetus has potential to "turn out well" (143d). Thus, I believe that this brief exchange helps us to capture the significance of the "digression" to the rest of the dialogue. That is, the digression is not actually a digression, in the sense that it is actually a central passage in the dialogue. If one does not read the brief introduction closely, one could fail to see this point. Speaking of the digression and the importance of good character, I want to conclude this post with a brief reflection on some of what Socrates says there. First, I found the following statement quite striking: "If, therefore, one meets a man who practices injustice and is blasphemous in his talk or in his life, the best thing for him by far is that one should never grant that there is any sort of ability about his unscrupulousness; such men are ready enough to glory in the reproach, and think that it means not that they are mere rubbish, cumbering the ground to no purpose, but that they have the kind of qualities that are necessary for survival in the community. We must therefore tell them the truth--that their very ignorance of their true state fixes them the more firmly therein. For they do not know what is in the penalty of injustice, which is the last thing of which a man should be ignorant" (176d). I believe that this quotation captures many experiences that I have had, especially with "rough and tumble" blue-collar co-workers and gang members (yes, I realize that these two folks do not usually share much in common). Many of the guys I know who belong to either of these groups actively reject the sorts of accounts of justice and virtue that Socrates would endorse, and they do so because they believe that such accounts make one weak and vulnerable. They usually tell me that embracing such accounts of justice will lead to my downfall. If I want to survive, they say, I will drop all of that morality *&^%. Putting aside the fact that all of these guys have embraced some form of justice/morality in various areas of their lives and interactions, I find that they exemplify the type of person and character that Socrates believes we ought to pity and caution against explicitly rebuking. As the proverbist says, sometimes you do not answer a fool according to their folly lest they seem wise in their own eyes. This is a tough piece of wisdom to swallow. Yet, I think it is spot on; at least it tracks with my experiences. Second, it seems Plato and Socrates are depicting a tight nit relationship between character and belief. As I understand it, it seems that the two are arranged in a sort of feedback loop. One's beliefs impact one's character, One's character impacts what one can or will believe. And on this cycle goes (I do not here mean to suggest that it is deterministic or unalterable). Again, this seems right to me. I confess, however, that I do not really like it. That is, I do not want the world to be that way. I want malformed people to believe things just as easily as well-formed people, especially when we are talking about the most important matters of life. Yet this does not usually happen. So, I suppose, Christian teachers may have yet another reason to pray for the LORD to mercifully work on their students so that they can learn the important truths that they and their other teachers have to teach.

Phaedo Part II

Two aspects of the final third of the Phaedo stuck out to me, one of which deal with the nature of philosophy and one of which deals with the theory of the Forms. With respect to philospohy, Socrates seems to argue that philosophy is lifelong process, because ascertaining the truth via argumentation is a lifelong process. I believe that Socrates is right on both of these points (I will not defend either of us here). Furthermore, I believe that it is of paramount importance that these points guide teachers and practicioners of philosophy. If philosophy and the ascertation of truth generally speaking is a slow and long process, we must communicate this in our classrooms. We can, of course, do this in a number of ways. For example, I try not to present more than four or five significant concepts in any given class. The reason for this is that I want my students to have time both to understand the concepts and then critically evaluate them. Likewsie, I start every class (besides the first day) by referencing what we discussed the previous class. I do this to help students see (a) that our class is something of a philosophical journey and (b) that evaluating the truths we consider is a process. Yes, we still are considering issues from the previous class (and from the beginning of the course for that matter), because it takes a long time to ascertain the truth via argumentation. In addition, I think that constructing courses with an eye to the history of the developments of the main issues in the course helps students to see the process like nature of discerning the truth. When one does this, students get the chance to see the progress and failures that some of the most brilliant thinkers have made about the topics that the students will take up. I acknowledge that some students find it demoralizing to see just how "little progresss" human beings have made in philosophy.Rather than keep students from this realization, I think that we should discuss what this may highlight about truth, human nature, and the limits of human inquiry. Here I am specifically thinking about the important theme of human finitued that runs throughout Western and Eastern philosophy.We do not, unless we are anti-realists, however, want to deny that human beings have made philosophical progess. Moreover, we need to stress to our students that what they believe impacts how they live. Thus, in a very real sense, they are stuck doing philosophy whether they like it or not. That is to say, most of my students realize that even though it is difficult to determine whether or not there is an afterlife, the answer to that question, or better yet, what they believe is the answer to that question, will substantially shape how they live their lives. So let us, like Socrates, come along side our students as we both seek the truth via argumentaiton. Turning to the theory of Forms, I found Socrates' discussion of the Forms woefully insufficient. Here I will simply mention two important issues that Socrates did not address, but must for his account to be superior to its rivals. First, it is not clear whether every predicate is a Form on Socrates' account. Socrates begins to address this issues when he talks about relations (e.g., John is taller than Jane), but I do not recall him saying much more than that Forms cannot consist of opposites; tallness, for example, cannot consist of shortness. Socrates must say more on this point, for at the very minimum he needs to provide some criterion for determining if and when a predicate does refer to an actual Form. Second, Socrates needs to explain how the different entities that reflect/participate in the form relate to one another on Earth. For instance, I am currently wearing a brown wool jacket. How, on Socrates' view,do the forms of jacketness and brownness relate/work together to make my jacket? Similarly, how do the virtues of courage, wisdom, empathy, and wittiness (to borrow from Aristotle) relate to on another in the soul, especially if they cannot be composite parts that make of the soul? These, I believe, are important questions that Socrates still needs to address.

Phaedo Part I

There are three points that I will discuss: (1) Cooper's discussion of the "historic Socrates," (2) the theme of the cyclical nature of pleasure following pain, and (3) the care that Socrates demonstrates for his friends' souls. In terms of (1), I am truly not sure why Cooper claims that "Plato seems to take particular pains to indicate that Phaedo does not give us Socrates' actual last conversation or even one that fits at all closely with his actual views." (49) The three pieces of evidence that Cooper uses to support this claim are (a)the explicit reference to Plato's absence for the conversation, (b)the fact that Socrates discusses the existence of Forms and a nonphysical realm, and (c) the claim that the later does not comport with Socrates' own description of his work in the Apology or how he conducts himself in Plato's Socratic dialogues. In terms of (a), I think Cooper has to provide us with an explanation as to why Plato's reference to his own absence entails or is evidence that the discussion is not historically accurate. Indeed, I think that it is important to note that this reference comes after the narrator has already agreed to recall all of the details of the event, and seems at least implicitly to agree to do so "as exactly as you can." (58d-e) As for (b)and (c), it seems that unless one assumes a certain account of both the historic Socrates and his relationship to Plato's rights, one will not find that these clearly highlight that Plato is presenting his own view. So before I accept Cooper's claims, I would at least like to hear how someone who holds to his view would address my concerns. With regard to (2), the theme of the cyclical nature of pleasure following pain, I want to highlight two scenes in the dialogue that capture this idea. The first is when Socrates initially introduces the idea in 60c. There Socrates discusses the pleasure that he feels know that his chains are gone; the chains, of course, had caused him pain. I believe that this scene sets the tone not only for the discussion of why philosophers above all other human beings are most ready/willing to die (so that they can flee the prison, confusion, and pain of the body), but for the literary structure of the dialogue. Time and time again, Socrates takes up a question that clearly is causing his friends pain, and provides them with a philosophical response that brings them pleasure. I believe that we most clearly see this 85b-89c (of course, I should also include Socrates' response). Simmias and Cebes have just brought a painful set of challenges to a philosophical argument that Socrates' provided and had fostered pleasure within many of his friends. Socrates will go on to take this painful set of questions, and give an answer to them that brings he and most of his friends great pleasure. Thus, it seems to me, the dialogue notes that philosophy can follow same pattern of pleasure coming after pain: one experiences pleasure after one has adequately addressed a thorny philosophical question that is of great import. The latter idea brings me to (3). I was stunned by how patient Socrates was throughout the dialogue. He seriously considers every difficult question that his friends bring. He does not come across as exasperated, eager to show that he is right, or patronizing. Instead, he gently entertains and responds to the important questions that his friends ask him. I think that this is a beautiful representation of what teachers can, and perhaps should, be like. I find that my students are most receptive to me when they trust that I care for them as human beings, and am, as they would say, therefore willing to seriously engage with what they think about, what worries them, what worries them, and what brings them joy. I believe that we would do well to try to exemplify these Socratic (or maybe not if Cooper is right, I am not sure) characteristics.

Abstract_10/24/2013

Here is my abstract. I look forward to reading what you all think. Blessings- Nathan Contemporary philosophers often explicitly or implicitly hold that the primary topic under consideration in the Laches is courage. One sees this, for example, in the work of Vlastos, Penner, and Santas. I argue that this view is mistaken. Instead, I contend that the discussion of courage serves to flesh-out the primary theme of the dialogue—namely, that the Athenian educational process is in disarray. I will defend this view by arguing for four theses. First, the dominant contemporary view does not adequately account for the discussion of learning at the beginning and end of the dialogue. Second, throughout the Laches, the characters disclose that few if any have taught or are teaching the youth about the most important issues in life. Third, Socrates argues that the narrow conception of courage within the Athenian Warrior Ethic that the generals have adopted is insufficient; it does not provide the necessary resources for young men to turn out well. Fourth and finally, the discussion of courage demonstrates that both generals are malformed and need moral instruction. This, of course, is problematic given the role that the generals have as senior leaders within the Athenian government.

Symposium Part 1

I confess that I have not had time to read anyone else's post. So please excuse me if I repeat what others have said. I found myself puzzled by how the initial structure of the Symposium. The first aspect that stands out to me is just how removed the narrator is from the original events that he retells. Moreover, Plato seems to go to great lengths to inform us about exactly how many layers of narration exist between us and the events that did transpire. It seems like this could serve to accomplish at least two opposite ends. On the one hand, Plato could use this literary devise to emphasize just how important the material in the Symposium is; our narrator spent a substantial amount of time "memorizing" most of an conversation that lasted over the course of an evening. The details are so important that people are asking our narrator to recite what he remembers for their edification. On this view, we as the readers seem to be the recipients of a special gift. On the other hand, Plato's explicit reference to the narrative layers and our narrator's inability to recall exactly the details of the conversation (let alone the fact that he acknowledges that he is simply telling us the points that he found important) could serve to let us know that we are not getting the whole story or should caution against taking the story too seriously. Although I hesitate to accept the latter option, I do not want to deny that it is a live option. On a different note, I enjoyed the heavy dose of irony and sarcasm in the first quarter of this dialogue. Here are just three instances that come to mind: (1) Socrates invites someone of lower stature to a party with him and then ends up urging him to run along with.out him; (2) Agathon rebukes Aristodemus for not bringing Socrates to the party when Socrates is the one who technically brought Aristodemus; and(3)Aristophanes of all people cannot speak at his turn because he has the hick-ups. On yet another different note, I think it is interesting that around 174d Socrates says to Aristodemus "Let's go...We'll think about what to say 'as we proceed the two of us along the way.'" I find this interesting for at least three reasons. First, Socrates ends up needing to think about "something to say" because that evening is filled with conversation and speeches. Second, the allusion to the Illiad is great given that Socrates actually does stop off multiple times because he gets an idea before Aristodemus. Third, they never even have to come up with something to say about Aristodemus's attendance at the party, because Agathon wanted him there. So that line fills "pregnant with meaning." Well, that is all that I want to say for now. My next post will go into depth about the actually points made in the speeches.

Republic: Lingering thoughts on Democracy and a Reflection on BK X

I want to begin by noting a few thoughts that I have had about Plato's/Socrates's discussion of democracy in BK VIII. I confess that most of my previous thoughts about this involved the US. You can see this in my previous post. Yet over the past four days or so I have tried to do more to put the discussion in its historic context. Ancient Athens, at least around the time of Socrates and Plato, was a democracy. I utterly failed to recall this as I read BK VIII. So I now think that I am beginning to appreciate just how radical Socrates's statements were. Indeed, I wonder if they might not be more radical than his comments about philosopher kings. To call out democracy like he does, it seems to me, is far more confrontational than saying that the best solution for a feverish city is to have philosopher kings rule it. I do not mean to down play just how radical that idea is/was. Still, for Socrates and Adeimantus to say what they do about democracy is radical and remarkable in a significant part because they are a direct, explicit rejection of Athenian democracy. This brings me to a lingering question. What is the significance of the fact that Adeimantus rather than Glaucon interacts with Socrates in his discussion of democracy? Is Adeimantus more prepared to discuss this and receive what Socrates has to teach than Glaucon? I honestly do not recall any textual clues that would support this. For that matter, I am not sure if there are any clues that address my question. If we can, I would like to talk about this in class. Final question about BK VIII. Do we have any records about the reception of Socrates's discussion of democracy? Such a condemnation of democracy, I can imagine, could have sparked an anger that rivals that that we read about in the Apology. Turning my attention to BK X, I find myself struck by the end. Socrates finally moves in for an all out attack of poetry, particularly the Homeric tradition. This attack, if I understand the text correctly, is not just addressed at the "ideal city." Instead, it seems to be a practical application based on what Socrates et. al. have learned about the nature of justice and injustice. This discussion may be the most radical claim of the Republic. For a Greek person to argue for and truly desire the end of Homer's influence on Greek society is astonishing. Could he argue for a more radical proposal? Either way, we certainly need to appreciate just how revolutionary Plato is. Indeed, I am now beginning to understand why Southern conservatives (from 1860-~1950) often spoke passionately against the revolutionary methods of the French Jacobins and Plato! Final thought. Does anyone else feel like the Republic ends on a rather unexpected and disappointing note? I honestly cannot tell how seriously we are supposed to take the myth of Er. Is it an instance of a "noble lie?" Why does Plato end his discussion of justice, particularly his discussion of the most important reasons to be just, with a myth? I truly am interested in what you all think. I for one am not sure.