Theaetetus Part II

In my last post, I primarily focused on how the beginning of the Theaetetus clandestinely introduces themes that run throughout the rest of the dialogue. In this post, I want to reflect on how the end of the dialogue helps us to interpret all that has come before. Here I am specifically thinking about the revelation that Socrates must end the conversation in order to make it to his trial. Perhaps the most obvious application of this revelation is that the charge that Socrates corrupts the youth is absurd. The Theaetetus shows the extent to which Socrates tries to care for the souls of the youth of Athens, particularly those who look like they will turn out well. Indeed, Socrates and Theodorus are committed to that task. In fact, they are willing to spend long periods of time working with the youth to purge them of false beliefs and direct them towards the truth while also inculcating their students with the virtues (like humility, wisdom, etc.). A second point to note is that the Theaetetus begins with two people talking about the character and excellence of the very person Socrates instructs throughout the dialogue--namely, Theaetetus. It seems that to some extent we are to see that Theaetetus's interaction with Socrates helped him to turn out well. Far from corrupting Theaetetus, Socrates helped him to become a good man who went on to serve Athens well. Indeed, Theaetetus has done so to the point of death. In other dialogues (e.g., the Laches), Plato claims that two necessary conditions for a good teacher is that they themselves are a good person, and that they have demonstrably improved the quality of their pupil. I take it that one of the aims of the Theaetetus is to show that Socrates fits this description, and therefore is a good teacher. A third and final point I will note is that the ending reveals how important caring for the souls of others is to Socrates. He is about to stand trial where it is likely that he will receive the death penalty, and he chooses to spend some of his final hours of freedom caring for the youth by practicing philosophy with them. One of the primary reasons he does this is to improve their souls and his own. This, it seems to me, is quite a daunting standard for us future teachers of philosophy. Faced with our own mortality, we too are choosing to care for the souls of others (especially the youth) by tending to their souls through philosophy. Or at least that is what Plato, I think, would have us see. I must confess that I often fail to see philosophical instruction in that light. Part of the reason for this is that many of my own philosophy instructors have not communicated this message to me. Instead, they have implicitly or explicitly argued that philosophy is about acquiring more knowledge or "pursing the truth." Yet they rarely, if ever, have related these endeavors to the formation and care of the human soul, my soul. I do not want to perpetuate that trend. I want to care for my soul and my students souls. Furthermore, I want to do this in part by practicing philosophy. I think philosophy is deeply medicinal; it helps to cure us of our spiritual ills. Of course, it is also possible to use philosophy in inimical ways that corrupt the soul even more. I fear that many of us will do this if we do not actively and intentionally try to care for our students. In short, I hope we can talk about this question: How can we be caring doctors rather than dispensers of information?

Theaetetus Part I

Spoiler Alert!!! Part of the following blog will reveal some of my presentation for tomorrow's class. Here I go... I continue to find the depth and richness of Plato's dialogues astounding. Consider, for example, the beginning of the Theaetetus. Between 142-146, Plato introduces many of the central themes of the dialogue (the importance of character, seems vs knowledge, age, memory, etc.). Yet he does so in an extremely subtle way. For instance, Euclides announces that he cannot tell Terpsion the exchange between Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus from memory: "Good Lord, no. Not from memory, anyway." (143a) This, it seems to me, serves as moment of foreshadowing that is easy to miss; Theaetetus and Socrates will eventually think long and hard about the relationship between memory and knowledge. A similar example of this is the emphasis with which Theodorus describes the good character of Theatetus. He is a fine young man who is generous with his money (144d) and has an "unusually gentle temper" (144a). This description helps Socrates understand why Theaetetus has potential to "turn out well" (143d). Thus, I believe that this brief exchange helps us to capture the significance of the "digression" to the rest of the dialogue. That is, the digression is not actually a digression, in the sense that it is actually a central passage in the dialogue. If one does not read the brief introduction closely, one could fail to see this point. Speaking of the digression and the importance of good character, I want to conclude this post with a brief reflection on some of what Socrates says there. First, I found the following statement quite striking: "If, therefore, one meets a man who practices injustice and is blasphemous in his talk or in his life, the best thing for him by far is that one should never grant that there is any sort of ability about his unscrupulousness; such men are ready enough to glory in the reproach, and think that it means not that they are mere rubbish, cumbering the ground to no purpose, but that they have the kind of qualities that are necessary for survival in the community. We must therefore tell them the truth--that their very ignorance of their true state fixes them the more firmly therein. For they do not know what is in the penalty of injustice, which is the last thing of which a man should be ignorant" (176d). I believe that this quotation captures many experiences that I have had, especially with "rough and tumble" blue-collar co-workers and gang members (yes, I realize that these two folks do not usually share much in common). Many of the guys I know who belong to either of these groups actively reject the sorts of accounts of justice and virtue that Socrates would endorse, and they do so because they believe that such accounts make one weak and vulnerable. They usually tell me that embracing such accounts of justice will lead to my downfall. If I want to survive, they say, I will drop all of that morality *&^%. Putting aside the fact that all of these guys have embraced some form of justice/morality in various areas of their lives and interactions, I find that they exemplify the type of person and character that Socrates believes we ought to pity and caution against explicitly rebuking. As the proverbist says, sometimes you do not answer a fool according to their folly lest they seem wise in their own eyes. This is a tough piece of wisdom to swallow. Yet, I think it is spot on; at least it tracks with my experiences. Second, it seems Plato and Socrates are depicting a tight nit relationship between character and belief. As I understand it, it seems that the two are arranged in a sort of feedback loop. One's beliefs impact one's character, One's character impacts what one can or will believe. And on this cycle goes (I do not here mean to suggest that it is deterministic or unalterable). Again, this seems right to me. I confess, however, that I do not really like it. That is, I do not want the world to be that way. I want malformed people to believe things just as easily as well-formed people, especially when we are talking about the most important matters of life. Yet this does not usually happen. So, I suppose, Christian teachers may have yet another reason to pray for the LORD to mercifully work on their students so that they can learn the important truths that they and their other teachers have to teach.

Phaedo Part II

Two aspects of the final third of the Phaedo stuck out to me, one of which deal with the nature of philosophy and one of which deals with the theory of the Forms. With respect to philospohy, Socrates seems to argue that philosophy is lifelong process, because ascertaining the truth via argumentation is a lifelong process. I believe that Socrates is right on both of these points (I will not defend either of us here). Furthermore, I believe that it is of paramount importance that these points guide teachers and practicioners of philosophy. If philosophy and the ascertation of truth generally speaking is a slow and long process, we must communicate this in our classrooms. We can, of course, do this in a number of ways. For example, I try not to present more than four or five significant concepts in any given class. The reason for this is that I want my students to have time both to understand the concepts and then critically evaluate them. Likewsie, I start every class (besides the first day) by referencing what we discussed the previous class. I do this to help students see (a) that our class is something of a philosophical journey and (b) that evaluating the truths we consider is a process. Yes, we still are considering issues from the previous class (and from the beginning of the course for that matter), because it takes a long time to ascertain the truth via argumentation. In addition, I think that constructing courses with an eye to the history of the developments of the main issues in the course helps students to see the process like nature of discerning the truth. When one does this, students get the chance to see the progress and failures that some of the most brilliant thinkers have made about the topics that the students will take up. I acknowledge that some students find it demoralizing to see just how "little progresss" human beings have made in philosophy.Rather than keep students from this realization, I think that we should discuss what this may highlight about truth, human nature, and the limits of human inquiry. Here I am specifically thinking about the important theme of human finitued that runs throughout Western and Eastern philosophy.We do not, unless we are anti-realists, however, want to deny that human beings have made philosophical progess. Moreover, we need to stress to our students that what they believe impacts how they live. Thus, in a very real sense, they are stuck doing philosophy whether they like it or not. That is to say, most of my students realize that even though it is difficult to determine whether or not there is an afterlife, the answer to that question, or better yet, what they believe is the answer to that question, will substantially shape how they live their lives. So let us, like Socrates, come along side our students as we both seek the truth via argumentaiton. Turning to the theory of Forms, I found Socrates' discussion of the Forms woefully insufficient. Here I will simply mention two important issues that Socrates did not address, but must for his account to be superior to its rivals. First, it is not clear whether every predicate is a Form on Socrates' account. Socrates begins to address this issues when he talks about relations (e.g., John is taller than Jane), but I do not recall him saying much more than that Forms cannot consist of opposites; tallness, for example, cannot consist of shortness. Socrates must say more on this point, for at the very minimum he needs to provide some criterion for determining if and when a predicate does refer to an actual Form. Second, Socrates needs to explain how the different entities that reflect/participate in the form relate to one another on Earth. For instance, I am currently wearing a brown wool jacket. How, on Socrates' view,do the forms of jacketness and brownness relate/work together to make my jacket? Similarly, how do the virtues of courage, wisdom, empathy, and wittiness (to borrow from Aristotle) relate to on another in the soul, especially if they cannot be composite parts that make of the soul? These, I believe, are important questions that Socrates still needs to address.

Phaedo Part I

There are three points that I will discuss: (1) Cooper's discussion of the "historic Socrates," (2) the theme of the cyclical nature of pleasure following pain, and (3) the care that Socrates demonstrates for his friends' souls. In terms of (1), I am truly not sure why Cooper claims that "Plato seems to take particular pains to indicate that Phaedo does not give us Socrates' actual last conversation or even one that fits at all closely with his actual views." (49) The three pieces of evidence that Cooper uses to support this claim are (a)the explicit reference to Plato's absence for the conversation, (b)the fact that Socrates discusses the existence of Forms and a nonphysical realm, and (c) the claim that the later does not comport with Socrates' own description of his work in the Apology or how he conducts himself in Plato's Socratic dialogues. In terms of (a), I think Cooper has to provide us with an explanation as to why Plato's reference to his own absence entails or is evidence that the discussion is not historically accurate. Indeed, I think that it is important to note that this reference comes after the narrator has already agreed to recall all of the details of the event, and seems at least implicitly to agree to do so "as exactly as you can." (58d-e) As for (b)and (c), it seems that unless one assumes a certain account of both the historic Socrates and his relationship to Plato's rights, one will not find that these clearly highlight that Plato is presenting his own view. So before I accept Cooper's claims, I would at least like to hear how someone who holds to his view would address my concerns. With regard to (2), the theme of the cyclical nature of pleasure following pain, I want to highlight two scenes in the dialogue that capture this idea. The first is when Socrates initially introduces the idea in 60c. There Socrates discusses the pleasure that he feels know that his chains are gone; the chains, of course, had caused him pain. I believe that this scene sets the tone not only for the discussion of why philosophers above all other human beings are most ready/willing to die (so that they can flee the prison, confusion, and pain of the body), but for the literary structure of the dialogue. Time and time again, Socrates takes up a question that clearly is causing his friends pain, and provides them with a philosophical response that brings them pleasure. I believe that we most clearly see this 85b-89c (of course, I should also include Socrates' response). Simmias and Cebes have just brought a painful set of challenges to a philosophical argument that Socrates' provided and had fostered pleasure within many of his friends. Socrates will go on to take this painful set of questions, and give an answer to them that brings he and most of his friends great pleasure. Thus, it seems to me, the dialogue notes that philosophy can follow same pattern of pleasure coming after pain: one experiences pleasure after one has adequately addressed a thorny philosophical question that is of great import. The latter idea brings me to (3). I was stunned by how patient Socrates was throughout the dialogue. He seriously considers every difficult question that his friends bring. He does not come across as exasperated, eager to show that he is right, or patronizing. Instead, he gently entertains and responds to the important questions that his friends ask him. I think that this is a beautiful representation of what teachers can, and perhaps should, be like. I find that my students are most receptive to me when they trust that I care for them as human beings, and am, as they would say, therefore willing to seriously engage with what they think about, what worries them, what worries them, and what brings them joy. I believe that we would do well to try to exemplify these Socratic (or maybe not if Cooper is right, I am not sure) characteristics.

Abstract_10/24/2013

Here is my abstract. I look forward to reading what you all think. Blessings- Nathan Contemporary philosophers often explicitly or implicitly hold that the primary topic under consideration in the Laches is courage. One sees this, for example, in the work of Vlastos, Penner, and Santas. I argue that this view is mistaken. Instead, I contend that the discussion of courage serves to flesh-out the primary theme of the dialogue—namely, that the Athenian educational process is in disarray. I will defend this view by arguing for four theses. First, the dominant contemporary view does not adequately account for the discussion of learning at the beginning and end of the dialogue. Second, throughout the Laches, the characters disclose that few if any have taught or are teaching the youth about the most important issues in life. Third, Socrates argues that the narrow conception of courage within the Athenian Warrior Ethic that the generals have adopted is insufficient; it does not provide the necessary resources for young men to turn out well. Fourth and finally, the discussion of courage demonstrates that both generals are malformed and need moral instruction. This, of course, is problematic given the role that the generals have as senior leaders within the Athenian government.

Symposium Part 1

I confess that I have not had time to read anyone else's post. So please excuse me if I repeat what others have said. I found myself puzzled by how the initial structure of the Symposium. The first aspect that stands out to me is just how removed the narrator is from the original events that he retells. Moreover, Plato seems to go to great lengths to inform us about exactly how many layers of narration exist between us and the events that did transpire. It seems like this could serve to accomplish at least two opposite ends. On the one hand, Plato could use this literary devise to emphasize just how important the material in the Symposium is; our narrator spent a substantial amount of time "memorizing" most of an conversation that lasted over the course of an evening. The details are so important that people are asking our narrator to recite what he remembers for their edification. On this view, we as the readers seem to be the recipients of a special gift. On the other hand, Plato's explicit reference to the narrative layers and our narrator's inability to recall exactly the details of the conversation (let alone the fact that he acknowledges that he is simply telling us the points that he found important) could serve to let us know that we are not getting the whole story or should caution against taking the story too seriously. Although I hesitate to accept the latter option, I do not want to deny that it is a live option. On a different note, I enjoyed the heavy dose of irony and sarcasm in the first quarter of this dialogue. Here are just three instances that come to mind: (1) Socrates invites someone of lower stature to a party with him and then ends up urging him to run along with.out him; (2) Agathon rebukes Aristodemus for not bringing Socrates to the party when Socrates is the one who technically brought Aristodemus; and(3)Aristophanes of all people cannot speak at his turn because he has the hick-ups. On yet another different note, I think it is interesting that around 174d Socrates says to Aristodemus "Let's go...We'll think about what to say 'as we proceed the two of us along the way.'" I find this interesting for at least three reasons. First, Socrates ends up needing to think about "something to say" because that evening is filled with conversation and speeches. Second, the allusion to the Illiad is great given that Socrates actually does stop off multiple times because he gets an idea before Aristodemus. Third, they never even have to come up with something to say about Aristodemus's attendance at the party, because Agathon wanted him there. So that line fills "pregnant with meaning." Well, that is all that I want to say for now. My next post will go into depth about the actually points made in the speeches.

Republic: Lingering thoughts on Democracy and a Reflection on BK X

I want to begin by noting a few thoughts that I have had about Plato's/Socrates's discussion of democracy in BK VIII. I confess that most of my previous thoughts about this involved the US. You can see this in my previous post. Yet over the past four days or so I have tried to do more to put the discussion in its historic context. Ancient Athens, at least around the time of Socrates and Plato, was a democracy. I utterly failed to recall this as I read BK VIII. So I now think that I am beginning to appreciate just how radical Socrates's statements were. Indeed, I wonder if they might not be more radical than his comments about philosopher kings. To call out democracy like he does, it seems to me, is far more confrontational than saying that the best solution for a feverish city is to have philosopher kings rule it. I do not mean to down play just how radical that idea is/was. Still, for Socrates and Adeimantus to say what they do about democracy is radical and remarkable in a significant part because they are a direct, explicit rejection of Athenian democracy. This brings me to a lingering question. What is the significance of the fact that Adeimantus rather than Glaucon interacts with Socrates in his discussion of democracy? Is Adeimantus more prepared to discuss this and receive what Socrates has to teach than Glaucon? I honestly do not recall any textual clues that would support this. For that matter, I am not sure if there are any clues that address my question. If we can, I would like to talk about this in class. Final question about BK VIII. Do we have any records about the reception of Socrates's discussion of democracy? Such a condemnation of democracy, I can imagine, could have sparked an anger that rivals that that we read about in the Apology. Turning my attention to BK X, I find myself struck by the end. Socrates finally moves in for an all out attack of poetry, particularly the Homeric tradition. This attack, if I understand the text correctly, is not just addressed at the "ideal city." Instead, it seems to be a practical application based on what Socrates et. al. have learned about the nature of justice and injustice. This discussion may be the most radical claim of the Republic. For a Greek person to argue for and truly desire the end of Homer's influence on Greek society is astonishing. Could he argue for a more radical proposal? Either way, we certainly need to appreciate just how revolutionary Plato is. Indeed, I am now beginning to understand why Southern conservatives (from 1860-~1950) often spoke passionately against the revolutionary methods of the French Jacobins and Plato! Final thought. Does anyone else feel like the Republic ends on a rather unexpected and disappointing note? I honestly cannot tell how seriously we are supposed to take the myth of Er. Is it an instance of a "noble lie?" Why does Plato end his discussion of justice, particularly his discussion of the most important reasons to be just, with a myth? I truly am interested in what you all think. I for one am not sure.

Republic Books VIII & IX

I want to point out two themes, for lack of a better term, in Books VIII and IX of the Republic that I would like to discuss in class. First, I found Socrates's discussion of how people within a democracy think about and use the notion of Freedom extremely germane for contemporary Americans. How many times, for example, did President George W. Bush claim that the US had the responsibility to spread democracy across the world, because God created human beings to be "Free"? When our soldiers and intelligence agencies did not find WMDs, Bush et. al. emphatically emphasized the need for the Iraqi people to live in Freedom and to establish a democracy. It seemed to me that this line of reasoning encouraged people to see (1) Freedom as a (or perhaps the) value of ultimate importance, (2) Democracy as the form of government that could foster freedom, and (3) that securing freedom for others is one of the most significant responsibilities that nations and their citizens have. One of the things that troubles me about this is that Bush et. al. never explained what they mean by "freedom." Nor, for that matter, did they ever really explain why it is worth the loss of human life to secure, even if it is the freedom of another. As Socrates argues, this is no small matter. Socrates points out that within democracies, citizens often think that freedom means no one and nothing can have authority over them. He mentions that those in leadership positions within a democracy often "tip-toe" around making imperatives. They fear the back lash that would ensue if their fellow citizens thought that they were infringing upon their freedom. I have encountered these patterns of behavior and ways of thinking everywhere I have lived. Yet, as I think Socrates's ironically points out, this view of freedom is inimical to human beings. On the one hand, it is inimical because it is a false view of freedom (likewise, its family conception in Sartre is false). Human beings simply do not have capital "F" freedom. We are contingent creatures with personal histories, familial relations, desires, etc. that shape us. I am not here endorsing determinism. Rather, I am saying that we have to recognize the limitations and influences that shape and direct human lives. On the other hand, it seems like Socrates believes that it is inimical because he thinks that human beings do not thrive apart from hierarchical relationships. Humans need guidance and leaders. This applies throughout their lives. Families, business, militaries,clubs, community groups, and so forth all require some sort of hierarchical structure to flourish. So whereas Socrates agrees that freedom is important, he both rejects the view of freedom that many within a democracy embrace for the reasons we have mentioned, and he proposes instead that human beings seek a freedom that is not equivalent to autonomy and extreme egalitarianism. I think all of these points are germane for us Americans who live in a "democracy" (that we do not actually live in a democracy but still have many who share the view of freedom that Socrates condemns are issues for another discussion). The second theme I would like to talk about in class is the development of the tyrant. In particular, I am interested in seeing how Socrates's discussion relates to the malformation of people like Thrasymachus and Callicles. While I do not think that either of these people are straightforwardly tyrants, I do believe that it is important for us to see the similarities between their views about justice, for example, and those that Socrates claims tyrants come to have. Do these men come from democratically run cities? Did they have the sorts of fathers that Socrates says the tyrant has? If their upbringing is different than that of a tyrant, why do they come to hold "tyrannical-like" views? I believe that this question is particularly pertinent given Socrates's claim that human beings, including those who become tyrants, do not start off with malformed natures. Thus its would seem that nurture is where the problem lies. Yet how does this account for what, at least I take to be, the prevalent love of money that Socrates rebukes? Or the tendency of "young people" to get carried away by their passions? Is this something that they learn, or is it something that they naturally have/develop apart from human inculcation? In short, how do non-tyrants become so tyrannical?

Republic Books V, VI, & VII

I had forgotten just how crammed full of rich, dense, complex, and important philosophical concepts are in Books V-VII of the Republic. In Book V Plato addresses the "three waves": (1)his claim about the basic equality between men and women; (2) his claim that "women are to belong in common to all the men, that none are to live privately with any man, and that the children, too, are to be possessed in common, so that no parent will know his own offspring or any child his parent"(457cff); and (3) his claim that the city will remain deeply flawed (to put it mildly) until it has a King who is a philosopher. In Book VI Plato details the qualities and strengths of a philosopher that make him well suited to be a king. In so doing he puts several misconceptions of philosophers to rest. Yet he also highlights the extremely fragile nature of philosophers. Plato then moves into a discussion of the Good, and ends Book VI with the famous "divided line" illustration and begins Book VII with the famous analogy of the cave. Book VII continues with a detailed discussion of the training and education of the philosopher so that he can rule over the city. Having provided a brief sketch of these three books, I want to spend the remainder of this post discussing a few features and a question that I have. First an observation. I never realized just how difficult it is on Plato's account for someone to become a mature philosopher. In particular, I some how failed to notice how easy Plato seems to think it is for the members of a city to utterly corrupt a perspective philosopher. Not only are very few equipped with a nature that is suitable for philosophy, but the those who are face the daunting task of avoiding the myriad impediments that life in the polis provides (intentionally and unintentionally) to stop good moral/philosophical development. The last sentence points to my second observation: it seems that moral development and philosophical development are extremely similar, at least in Plato's discussion of the philosopher. This makes me wonder about just how rare Plato thinks virtuous people are. That is to say, Plato explicitly states that it is extremely rare to find a philosopher. If the philosopher is also the truly virtuous man, and thus the morally well developed person, than those who do not have his level of moral development are, at least in some sense, immoral. I think that this point becomes even more poignant when you get to the end of Book VI and the beginning of Book VII. There it seems that it is the philosopher who gets a true understanding of the Good, and thus reaches a necessary step for complete moral development. Yet one perhaps may also so that once the philosopher has seen the Good, the philosopher recognizes just how far he has to go to become a good person in light of his encounter, as it were, of the Good. Thus, even though the philosopher already had to possess a certain level of proper moral formation to see the Good, and very few people ever attain that, he still comes to realize that this level of development is but rudimentary. So much the worse, I suppose, for the average Greek (we dare not speak about the Barbarian) who continues to play the "name that shadow" game. My third observation is that the cave analogy seems to imply that moral development is extremely difficult and violent. The word "drag" comes up multiple times in Plato's discussion of the hike out of the cave. Is it appropriate to say that this imagery reflects how rigorous and coercive moral formation is? If so, how do we square this with how Socrates interacts with his questioners throughout this and many other dialogues. I must say that Socrates, if he is supposed to serve as an example of someone who tries to lead others out of the cave, does not seem to interact in a particularly aggressive or violent way. This leads me to wonder if I am pushing the cave analogy too far. Finally, my question. Could we please take time to unpack the section on the divided line? I find it quite a challenge to follow Socrates's line of reasoning through that passage. I honestly think that most of my understanding of that passage comes from how Socrates relates it to the cave analogy.

Reflection on Books III & IV of the Republic

Three features in books III and IV of the Republic strongly caught my attention. In what follows, I will discuss them in order that they appear in the text. The first feature of these two books of the Republic that caught my attention was the amount of time that Socrates spends discussing the importance of musical training for moral development. I believe it is important to note that even though Socrates does emphasize the importance of the lyrics of songs, he also pays a considerable amount of time stressing the importance of learning the "instrumental" side of music (for lack of a better phrase). I think he is right to do so. On the one hand, the lyrics of songs clearly do strongly shape those who sing them. Consider, for example, the role that songs play in the military. Every new recruit at boot camp or an academy spends hours learning songs filled with rich lyrics about the tradition and values of the particular branch of the military that they join. Indeed, I have read several memoirs by soldiers in which the soldiers stress how much they cherished and those songs, particularly because they provided them with a picture of their identity. Similarly, nations, religious groups, and organizations (such as college's and sporting teams) all have songs that contain lyrics which enforce/re-enforce their values and vision. Yet the tone, again for lack of a better word, to which these songs are set also have immense significance for moral formation. Consider, for example, the way in which the structure of a song can bespeak the structure of the moral universe (I take it that this is something Socrates has in mind throughout the Republic). Just as each note has its place and must be what it is for the creation of a beautiful piece of music, so to, the analogy goes, does the world consists of a certain moral order that has structure which, when followed, is beautiful. If this is true, and I think that there certainly is at least something right about it, then how does the shallow, ugly, and thoughtless music of American culture contribute to the moral formation of Americans? It would seem that we may have to say that it has a significantly negative affect. If we reject this conclusion, there where exactly is it that we part from Socrates's view of the world and the importance of music for moral formation? (As a side note, I wonder how this relates to Paul's discussion of the relationship between being filled with the Spirit to singing songs, hymns, and spiritual songs in Ephesians 5). As for the second feature of these books, I am deeply troubled by Socrates's portrayal of love (cf.403-404). Socrates's seems to suggest that sexual pleasure has no place in a loving relationship. This seems wrong. That is to say, while I do acknowledge that not all forms of love have a sexual component (love between friends, love of a community, etc.), I think that human beings are supposed to express some forms of love by having sex. I cannot imagine, for example, that a husband and wife could love one another well/appropriately without having sex (assuming that it is physically safe for them to do so). Would Socrates truly respond to this by saying that such sexual intercourse was always "mad" and "licentious"? If so, I think that he would have to stretch the meaning of those words in a way that distorts them. What do my fellow classmates think? Third and finally, Socrates seems to think that human beings are a natural part of the world. Indeed, he seems to argue implicitly that so long as human beings act in accordance with virtue, they and the rest of the natural world will hum along quite nicely. He even goes so far as to suggest that the world naturally supplies all of the needs for the city. Here I am thinking of cobblers, blacksmiths, and carpenters in addition to items like food, drink, and materials for shelter. Do many people living today hold these views? I honestly am not sure. On the one hand, many environmentalists are extremely interested in virtue theory, because they do think that the virtuous person will live in accord with the natural rhythms of nature. There are, of course, those who think that human beings simply do not belong on Earth, but I take it that they are in the extreme minority. On the other hand, I do not know of many who implicitly champion that the world naturally provides cities with every form of "worker" that cities need to function. Rather, I know of some who argue that unless one does see slavery as natural, then one must see cities as unnatural because they always seem to require a "slave-like-class" to function (here I am not thinking exclusively about chattel slavery). In saying this, however, I do want to keep in mind that Socrates's discussion of this subject comes in his imaginary discourse about a sick city. Thus, I am not sure exactly how to read his comments in general, and this idea in particular. What do my fellow classmates think?

Plato's Republic Books I&II

I have never read the Republic in its entirety. In fact, in every class I have taken that covered Plato I only had to read books V-VII. So as someone who (a) finds Plato extremely interesting and thought provoking and (b) is interested in thinking about justice, I was particularly excited about working through the Republic from start to finish. Having finished reading the first two books, I find that I have far more questions about the structure and content of the beginning of this dialogue than I have for any other work by Plato. In what follows, I will list several of the most vexing questions that I continue to ponder. I will conclude with a few brief remarks about what I think that this dialogue teaches about the necessity of being a certain type of person in order to appreciate and benefit from philosophy. First, my questions. For the ease of reading, I will simply list these in bullet form. - Is it significant that the dialogue takes place outside of the main city of Athens? - What is the significance of Socrates going down to pray to the recently installed cult for Bendis in Piraeus? - Should we see this dialogue as a defense of Socrates in that it seems to emphasies that it is not Socrates who has corrupted the youth of Athens (here I am especially thinking about Thrasymachus) but others who have spread falsehoods about the value of injustice over justice? - Why is Thrasymachus so overwhelmingly rude to Socrates? - Does Thrasymachus give up debating Socrates, and merely nod his head to Socrates final set of questions? It seemed like it to me. In fact, this section reminded me of the debate between Callicles in Plato's Gorgias. - Why, after such a detailed and nuanced presentation of why injustice seems to be better/make people more happy/what people want more than justice, does Socrates launch into a rather convoluted discussion of how to construct a city? I realize that Socrates does this because he and his interloculors what to determine how jsutic and injustice come into a city and work within a city, but I must say that he seems to be a long way off from addressing Adeimantus and Glaucon. What is more, his response seems overwhelmingly tedious (perhaps as tedious as Thrasumachus was rude) and seems to distance the reader and the rest of those invovled in the dialogue from the tough questions set forth by Adeimantus and Glaucon to the point were all invovled could/perhaps do forget what questions Socrates is suppose to answer. - Why does Socrates resort to analogies far more often than examples? Those are all of the questions that I want to raise in this post. Now I will say a few things about what I think the dialogue teaches about the necessity of being a certain type of person in order to appreicate and benefit from philosophy. The difference between Socrates's conversation with Cephalus and every other conversationt that Socrates has is stark. Whereas Cephalus comes across as a wise, generous, elderly man who has learned much from his life experiences, the young ment that Socrates interacts with seem unwise, foolish, and inexperienced. It seems to me that Cephalus want to talk with Socrates and is in fact able to interact with Socrates well because he has become a certain type of person, one who can appreciate and learn what Socrates has to teach. Many of the youth, on the otherhand, seem plauged and malformed by innimical theories that they have accepted and strive to live by. They lack the journey-like experience that Cephalus discusses, and instead have bought into the quick and easy to understand moral instructions that the sophists have peddled. In short, it seems that this dichotomy draws attention to the necessity of being a certain type of person before you can rightly engage in philosophy. In this regard, the dialogue's beginning seems to support Aristotle's claims regarding why it is inappropriate for young people to engage in politics and why they will not be able to benefit from rich moral teaching if they have not reached a certain point in moral development.

Reflection on Plato's Apology

August 28, 2013

A Reflection on Plato's Apology

This is the third time that I have read the Apology. That said, it had been over a year and a half since I last read it, so I decided to take my time and read the text as carefully as I would if I were reading it for the first time. I am glad that I did this for a number of reasons. First, I do not believe that I ever realized how poor Socrates's initial arguments against Meletus were. In 24b-24e, Socrates proposes an invalid argument against Meletus claim that he (Socrates) corrupts the youth. In response to Meletus, Socrates asks him to inform those gathered in the court who it is that improves the youth. When Meletus is silent, Socrates excoriates him and tells him that this shows that he has not really been concerned with whether or not Socrates has been corrupting the youth. Yet it simply does not follow that because Meletus claims that Socrates corrupts the youth that Meletus has to know who improves the youth. To get to that conclusion, Socrates's argument needs at least one more  premise--namely, "if Meletus knows who corrupts the youth, then he also knows who improves them." From here we could claim that because Meletus does not know who improves the youth, he does not know who corrupts them. I realize that this is not quite the same thing as "has not been concerned about the issue," but it is at least closer and shows that Meletus is ill-suited to bring charges against Socrates because he does not actually know what he is talking about.

In a similar argument, Socrates claims that Meletus has wrongly brought charges against him, because he claims that Socrates and Socrates alone is corrupting the youth. I find Socrates's attempt to use an analogy from equestrian care (and eventually the claim that what applies to horse applies to all other animals) insufficient to establish his point. Far from showing that Meletus's claim is wrong by referencing others who clearly were corrupting the youth, Socrates says that just as horses do not have more than one person improving them, so too humans do not have more than one person improving them. Therefore, Meletus is wrong to say that all of Athens except for Socrates is improving the youth. But why should we think that this analogy is appropriate? Again, it would help if Socrates referred us at that point in his defense (25b-25c) to others who are clearly corrupting the youth. That would be sufficient to prove Meletus's claim false.

All of that being said, I do think that several of Socrates's arguments are quite good. I think that, for example, he really nails Meletus on his false charge that Socrate's does not believe in a god.

Two more comments and then I will stop. First, I think that Socrates's earlier claims about obeying the god would have been more powerful if he had mentioned the dreams and visions that Apollo had given as a further explanation for why he went around rebuking the people of Athens. His claim that the oracle said he was the wisest man does not mean that the oracle bade him (23b) to inquire of the wisdom of his fellow Athenians or to show them that they were not as wise as they thought. Second, I think that Socrates's comments regarding the inability to serve in political office and remain virtuous seem quite right. As he said, if one tries to live virtuously as a politician, one often is run-out of office because one is failing to adhere to the desires of one's colleagues. This, I believe, is remarkably sad, especially since the fact that Plato and Socrates held to this view means that this problem has been around a long time.